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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT GLEN HOUTZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 20608 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Statement of Issues Presented on Appeal 
A* Did the Court's decision to try the case in the 
Defendant's absence deny Defendant his constitutional right to be 
present at trial. 
B. Were Defendant's conviction and sentence a denial 
of his right to the equal protection of the laws. 
C. Was there sufficient evidence as a matter of law to 
find the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time 
of the accident. 
Statement of the Nature of the Case 
The Defendant-Appellant, ROBERT GLEN HOUTZ, appeals 
from a conviction and judgment of two counts of Automobile 
Homicide, a felony of the third degree, two counts of Driving 
while under the Influence of Alcohol and Inflicting Bodily Injury 
to Another, a Class A Misdemeanor and one count each of Leaving 
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the Scene of Accident involving Death and Injury to Persons, a 
Class A Misdemeanor, Leaving Scene of Accident Involving Damage 
to Property, a Class B Misdemeanor and Failure to Report 
Accident, a Class B Misdemeanor, in the Fifth Judicial District 
Court in and for Beaver County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. 
Harlan Burns, presiding. 
Disposition of the Lower Court 
The Defendant-Appellant, ROBERT GLEN HOUTZ, was charged 
with two counts (Counts 1 & 2 of the Information) of Automobile 
Homicide, a Felony of the Third Degree, in violation of Section 
76-5-207, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, two counts 
(Counts 3 & 4 of the Information) of Driving while under the 
Influence of Alcohol and Inflicting Bodily Injury to Another, a 
Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41-6-44, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, and one count each of (Count 5) 
Leaving the Scene of Accident involving Death and Injury to 
Persons, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41-6-29, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, (Count 6) Leaving Scene of 
Accident Involving Damage to Property, a Class B Misdemeanor in 
violation of Section 41-6-30, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended and (Count 7) Failure to Report Accident, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41-6-34, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. The Defendant was convicted of all 
counts as charged in a jury trial held without the presence of 
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the Defendant and was sentenced to incarceration at the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term of not to exceed five 
years and a fine in the amount of $5,000,00 on Count 1, an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five year to be served 
consecutively on Count 2, a term of 364 days to be served 
consecutively on Count 3, a term of 364 days on Count 4, to be 
served concurrently with the term imposed on Count 3, a term of 
364 days on Count 5, to be served concurrently with the term 
imposed on Count 3 and no additional term of imprisonment on 
Counts 6 and 7 since they are deemed merged into the offense 
committed in Count 5 of the Information, 
Relief Sought on Appeal 
Defendant-Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction 
and judgment rendered below and reversal of the lower court's 
denial of Defendant-Appellant's Motion to Dismiss, dismissal of 
the information or in the alternative to have the case remanded 
to the Fifth Judicial Court for a new trial. 
Statement of Facts 
On August 12, 1984, DONALD GRONDEL, NONA GRONDEL, 
SHIRLEY ANN GRONDEL and DEREK GRONDEL were travelling north on 
-3-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1-15 in a small four door Datsun. (T. 34, 35, 36) Sometime 
between 6:00 and 9:00 p.m. (T. 44) or just before twilight or 
dark (T. 67) , the GRONDEL vehicle was merging onto Highway 1-15 
from a rest stop. (T. 37) 1-15 at that point had two lanes of 
traffic going each way. (T. 37) Just as the GRONDEL vehicle was 
merging onto the right lane of 1-15, a white truck (T. 39), or a 
brown or bronze colored truck (T. 55) , travelling at a high rate 
of speed (T. 59), struck the GRONDEL vehicle from behind. (T. 40, 
62) The GRONDEL vehicle rolled over ejecting all four passengers 
(T. 41) , and the truck continued up the road. (T. 62) The point 
of the accident was seventeen miles north of Beaver on 1-15. (T. 
155) 
Floyd Vaughn from Honolulu, Hawaii testified that he 
witnessed the accident (T. 54, 55), that he had seen what 
appeared to be the same truck about one-half hour before the 
accident (T. 56) , that at that time the vehicle was travelling 
about seventy to eighty miles per hour when it passed Vaughn's 
vehicle (T. 57) , and that the truck ran off the side of the road 
on the passing lane and then cut in front of Vaughn's vehicle. 
(T. 57) 
Later a few minutes before the accident, Vaughn 
observed the same truck coming up. At that time Vaughn observed 
References to the trial transcript of February 27, 28, 
1985 will be designated "T". References to the February 26, 1985 
hearing will be designated "T " . 
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the same shirtless male with light-colored hair as being the 
occupant of the truck. (T. 60) After passing the van, Vaughn 
observed: 
. . . he was going fast and he kinda from — 
he almost ran off the road on the — in his 
own lane side, which is the median like between 
the roads." (T. 60) I saw him run off one side 
of the road, then the other at a high speed. 
(T. 61) 
When the truck came to the GRONDEL vehicle it was on 
the right hand lane and ". . .it looked like he was pulling in to 
pass, only he just slammed into that car." (T. 62) 
Vaughn stayed at the scene five minutes then drove up 
the road to call for an ambulance and the highway patrol. (T. 66) 
As Vaughn continued along 1-15 he saw the same truck 
pulled over by the side of the road. (T. 69) He stopped, wrote 
down the California license plate number, saw the same person he 
had seen driving the truck before, asleep in the vehicle. (T. 70) 
Vaughn noticed the odor of what he assumed to be alcohol. (T. 75) 
He called the Utah Highway Patrol. (T. 72) 
State Trooper Brent Shelby testified he had been given 
a license plate number and description of a vehicle from the Orem 
Highway Patrol dispatcher (T. 84), the description being a bronze 
GMC or Chevrolet pickup with a damaged right front and California 
License No. 1W01049. (T. 85, 86) 
Trooper Shelby located a vehicle matching the 
description in Juab County a couple of miles north of the Yuba 
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Lake Interchange northbound just to the side of 1-15 (T. 86) , at 
approximately 10:50 p.m. on August 12, 1984. (T. 96, 98) A male 
adult in his latter forties or early fifties, grayed white hair, 
six feet tall, 175 - 185 pounds, was observed asleep in the 
vehicle (T. 17), identified by California Driverfs License as 
ROBERT GLEN HOUTZ. (T. 89) 
MR. HOUTZ was awakened and informed he was under arrest 
for DUI and suspicion of automobile homocide. He was taken to a 
hospital and a blood sample was taken at 11:36 p.m. (T. 96, 98) 
The blood sample tested at .27 weight per volume percent. (T.134) 
Trial was scheduled for February 25, 19 85 and notice 
was given to Defendant's counsel. (T. 13) The Court was advised 
by counsel for Defendant that the Defendant intended to waive the 
jury and try the case before the judge. (T2.3) Since the Court 
had a jury already summoned for February 25, 1985, the Court 
scheduled another jury trial on February 25, 1985 and informed 
counsel that non-jury trial would begin on February 26, 1985. 
(T. 22) The Defendant did not appear at trial on February 26, 
1985 because he was in custody in San Diego, California on a 
charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. (T. 13) MR. 
HOUTZ was arrested on the DUI charge in San Diego on February 25, 
1985. (T. 13) 
The Defendant's counsel moved the Court to continue the 
trial until HOUTZ could be present but the Court denied the 
motion. (T. 24) The jury trial took place on February 27th and 
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28th, 1985. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts 
charged in the Information. The Defendant waived extradition on 
March 1, 1985 and returned to Beaver County just a few days after 
trial. The Defendant appeared for sentencing on March 18, 1985. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
(1) The Defendant has a constitutional right to be 
present at trial but that right can be waived by conduct or 
words, such as where the Defendant voluntarily absents himself 
from trial. Generally, a person in custody is not a free agent 
and therefore cannot voluntarily waive his right to be present at 
trial. The burden is on the State to show voluntariness on the 
part of the Defendant who absents himself from trial. 
The Defendant, ROBERT GLEN HOUTZ, did not appear at 
trial because he was incarcerated in jail in San Diego, 
California prior to the date set for trial. The State made no 
effort to determine if the Defendant would waive extradition and 
how quickly he could be brought to Utah, even though the State 
was aware that the Defendant was in jail. In actuality, the 
Defendant did waive extradition and was brought to Beaver County 
very quickly. The State failed to meet their burden of showing 
voluntariness and the Court should have granted Defendant's 
Motion to Continue the Trial until Defendant could be present. 
(2) Equal protection of the laws guarantees like 
treatment of all those who are similarly situated and our 
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criminal justice system contemplates a series of graded offenses, 
that depend upon increasingly culpable mental states. The recent 
decision of State v. Bryan, No. 18948 (Utah, June 6, 1985), where 
the court reversed Defendant's sentence on a manslaughter 
conviction and ordered the lesser punishment provided under the 
negligent homicide statute in the motor vehicle code because both 
statutes specified the same "reckless" conduct, has created a 
situation where this Defendant, ROBERT GLEN HOUTZ, has not been 
treated equally. 
Either Mr. HOUTZ received a more severe punishment than 
the Defendant in Bryan, for identical "reckless" conduct because 
the prosecutor chose to file automobile homicide charges rather 
than manslaughter charges or in the alternative, the Defendant's 
conduct was less culpable than the Defendant's conduct in Bryan 
(negligent rather than reckless conduct) and this Defendant is 
being unfairly punished more severely than the Defendant in 
Bryan. Therefore, the Defendant's sentence should be reversed 
and the lesser punishment provided in Bryan, should be awarded 
HOUTZ. 
(3) The State provided no direct evidence that the 
Defendant, ROBERT GLEN HOUTZ, was under the influence of alcohol 
at the time of the accident, only circumstantial evidence that 
the Defendant was speeding and going from side to side on the 
road. That driving pattern could have been caused by 
circumstances that are not alcohol related. Results of a blood 
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alcohol test taken approximately two and one-half hours after the 
alleged driving should not have been admitted in accordance with 
the rules of evidence. 
The Defendant was discovered about two hours after the 
accident approximately eighty (80) miles away from the accident 
scene. The State did not present any evidence that excluded the 
possibility that the Defendant could have become intoxicated 
after the accident. Since the State had the burden of excluding 
this possibility and failed, Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the 
Information should have been dismissed or alternatively Counts 1 
and 2 reduced to Negligent Homicide. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT TRIAL. 
The right to be present at trial is guaranteed by the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States and by Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
This right has been codified in Section 77-1-6 (1) (a) (d) Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended and Section 77-35-17(a)(2) Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. 
In State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 51 P.2d 1052, 1055 
(1935) , the Court stated the applicable law with regard to the 
right to be present at trial: 
-9-
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The right to be present at all stages of the 
trial is claimed to be of such an absolute 
character that it cannot be waived either by 
counsel or the Defendant, and when the Court 
permits the trial to proceed in the absence 
of the Defendant the judgment of conviction 
must be set aside. There is no doubt but 
that the constitutional right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel is a sacred 
right of one accused of crime which may not 
be infringed or frittered away, and is one 
which may not be denied by a Court or be 
waived by counsel. 
Concerning whether the right to be present at trial can be waived 
by a Defendant, the Court said: 
Whether such right may be waived by the Defendant 
personally is a question on which the authorities 
are divided. . . The great weight of authority is 
that the Defendant may, by conduct or in words, 
waive such right, and that he may not take 
advantage of his voluntary absence, if he is at 
liberty on bail during some part of the proceedings 
at which it is his duty as well as his right to be 
in attendance. (Id at 1055) 
However, when the Defendant is in custody, the Court must see 
that he is present for trial: 
Where Defendant is in custody, and therefore 
not a free agent, the duty is on the Court to 
see that he is personally present at every 
stage of the trial . . . His absence would be 
imputed, not to him, but to his custodian. . . 
Proceedings had in the absence of the Defendant 
without his fault and without his knowledge or 
consent, is ground for reversal. (Id at 1056) 
In State v. Okamura, 570 P.2d 848 (1977), the Hawaii 
Supreme Court held that the burden rests on the prosecution to 
show voluntariness on the part of one who absents himself from 
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trial. With regard to whether a Defendant in custody can waive 
his right to be present at trial, the Court said: 
It is true that a Defendant not in custody may 
consent to a waiver of his right to be present 
at trial. . . but it is doubtful in a felony 
case that he has the power to do so when he is 
being held in custody. (Evans v. United States, 
284 F.2d 393, 395 (6th Cir. 1960) Id at 852 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah apparently 
agrees with the Hawaii Supreme Court that the burden is on the 
State to show voluntariness on the part of the Defendant who 
absents himself from trial. In State v. Ross, 655 P.2d 641, 642 
(1982), the Utah Supreme Court said: 
Counsel for Defendant, on appeal, urges that the 
onus is on the State to show voluntariness of 
absence and lack of consent to a trial in 
absentia to satisfy one's constitutional right 
to "due process.11 No one denies the general 
principal involved, but if the State failed in any 
respect in its obligation to establish voluntariness, 
or waiver of consent, the Defendant supplied any 
such void by his own actions which prevented his 
attendance at trial. (Id underlining added) 
In State v. Ross, (supra), the trial had actually 
commenced with the Defendant present but after several days the 
trial was continued because of the Defendant's medical problems. ' 
Defendant, who was released on bail during this continuance, 
absconded and was arrested on other charges in Nebraska. He was 
released on bail and could have returned immediately to Utah, { 
with Nebraska's consent, to continue the trial, but the Defendant 
refused to return and even fought an extradition warrant. The 
i 
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Court held that the Defendant's voluntary actions were sufficient 
to establish voluntariness or waiver of consent. 
In the present case, written notice of trial was sent 
to Defendant's counsel, setting trial for on the 25th day of 
February, 1985. (T. 21) The Court, based on information that the 
Defendant intended to waive the jury, rescheduled the matter for 
February 26, 1985 upon oral notice to Defendant's counsel. 
(T. 22) Defendant's counsel contacted Defendant and told him the 
trial would start Tuesday, the 26th. (T. 14) The State became 
aware that the Defendant was in jail in California in San Diego 
on the 26th of February. (T. 13) The Court had continued the 
trial date until February 27th (T2. 8), and the trial lasted two 
days. (T. 1) Nowhere in the record did the State make any 
attempt to contact Mr. Houtz or to determine if he would be 
willing to waive extradition and how quickly he could be brought 
to Utah. In actuality, Mr. Houtz did waive extradition and was 
immediately brought to Beaver County and appeared for sentencing 
on March 18, 1985. (See Judgment and Sentence and Commitment) 
In State v. Ross, supra, the fact that the State made 
the effort to try to extradite the Defendant in order to conclude 
his trial and that the Defendant refused to waive extradition 
seemed to carry at lot of weight in the Court's decision that the 
Defendant voluntarily absented himself or waived his right to be 
present. 
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In the present case, the State made no effort at all to 
contact the Defendant, while he was in custody, to determine if 
he could be brought back to stand trial. Since the Defendant was 
arrested before he was to appear for trial, he was in custody and 
unable to voluntarily waive his right to be present at trial. 
The State's failure to make any effort to bring Defendant back 
from San Diego for trial seems to be prima facie evidence that 
they failed to meet their burden of showing voluntariness on the 
part of Defendant. 
The lower Court's refusal to continue the trial 
resulted in a denial of MR. HOUTZ Constitutional right to be 
present at trial. The fact that the lower Court did proceed 
without the presence of the Defendant requires a reversal of the 
judgment of conviction and this Court should remand the case to 
the District Court for a new trial. 
POINT II. 
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE OF TWO CONSECUTIVE ZERO TO FIVE YEAR TERMS 
FOR HIS CONVICTION ON TWO AUTOMOBILE HOMOCIDE COUNTS WAS A DENIAL 
OF HIS EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently explained the 
Court's responsibility to insure the evenhanded application of 
the criminal laws. 
. . . Nevertheless, we cannot disregard our 
responsibility to assure the rational and 
evenhanded application of the criminal laws. 
Equal protection of the law guarantees like 
treatment of all those who are similarly situated. 
-13-
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Accordingly, the criminal laws must be written 
so that there are significant differences between 
offenses and so that the exact same conduct is 
not subject to different penalties depending 
under which of two statutory sections a prosecutor 
chooses to charge. That would be a form of 
arbitrariness that is foreign to our system of 
law. . .State v. Bryan, No. 18948 (Utah, June 6, 1985) 
With regard to specific statutes this Court has said: 
Statutes which treat classes of citizens 
differently do not offend equal protection 
guarantees unless the classification and 
different treatment bear no rational relationship 
to the objective of the legislation. 
(Liedtke v. Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah 1982). 
Statutes may deal with different classes 
differently, if all within the same class are 
treated uniformly, and so long as there is 
some reasonable basis for differentiation 
between classes related to the purpose of the 
statute. (State v. Piepenburg, 602 P.2d 702 
(Utah 1979) 
In State v. Bryan, supra at 6, the Supreme Court 
explained that if an intoxicated driver negligently causes the 
death of another, he can be found guilty of automobile homocide, 
a third degree felony, but if an intoxicated driver acts 
"recklessly" he can be found guilty of manslaughter, a second 
degree felony. The Court said: 
Our justice system contemplates a series of 
graded offenses, that depend upon increasingly 
culpable mental states. If the State can prove 
that a defendant acted with the more culpable 
mental state, the defendant can be convicted 
of the higher offense. 
However, the Court, in Bryan, supra, reversed 
Defendant's sentence on a manslaughter conviction because the 
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definition of "recklessness" under the manslaughter statute and 
"reckless disregard of the safety of others", as defined in the 
negligent homocide statute in the Motor Vehicle Code were 
determined to be the same. The Court then determined the 
Defendant was entitled to the lesser punishment provided under 
the negligent homocide statute in the Motor Vehicle Code, 
Now, due to the decision in Bryany supra, and until the 
legislature can consider this problem, there is no longer a 
series of graded offenses as contemplated by the legislature and 
the classification and different treatment given intoxicated 
drivers who cause the death of others bears no rational 
relationship to the objective of the legislature. There is no 
reasonable basis for the differentiation between reckless and 
negligent conduct of intoxicated drivers. The current statutes 
and court rulings provide the person guilty of the more culpable 
conduct with a lesser sentence. 
In Bryan, supra, the evidence established that the 
Defendant had been drinking heavily and had been driving at a 
high rate of speed while driving through red semifor lights on 
heavily travelled roads. 
In the present case, the prosecution claims that the 
Defendant was heavily intoxicated and was driving at an extremely 
high rate of speed. The prosecutor chose to charge the Defendant 
with two counts of automobile homocide rather than attempt to 
gain a conviction for two counts of manslaughter. Had the 
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prosecutor charged and obtained a conviction on manslaughter, the 
Defendant would have been entitled to be punished under the 
misdemeanor statute of negligent homocide under the Motor Vehicle 
Code. 
Alternatively, if the conduct of the Defendant HOUTZ 
was actually negligent and not reckless, then the Defendant's 
conduct was less culpable than the Defendant's conduct in Bryan, 
supra, and this Defendant is being unfairly punished more 
severely than the Defendant in Bryan, supra. 
In order to provide the Defendant, HOUTZ, with equal 
protection of the laws Defendant should be entitled to be 
sentenced under the misdemeanor provisions. 
Therefore, Defendant requests that this Court reverse 
his sentencing under the felony provisions of the automobile 
homocide statute and remand the case to the District Court to be 
sentenced as a misdemeanor. 
POINT III. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT DEFENDANT WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AT THE TIME OF 
THE ACCIDENT. 
The trial transcript does not reveal an exact time of 
the accident. Mr. Conrad Grimshaw testified that he received a 
call to respond to the accident at 9:30 p.m. on August 12, 1984. 
(T. 49) Mr. Grimshaw testified that he was the second ambulance 
and that he thought the first ambulance was enroute about 9:15 
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p.m. and probably received a call approximately 9:10 to 9:12 p.m. 
(T. 51) SHIRLEY ANN GRONDEL, one of the victims in this matter, 
testified that she did not remember what time the accident 
happened other than sometime between 6:00 and 9:00 p.m. (T. 44) 
Mr. Floyd Vaughn testified that he stopped for around five 
minutes to give aid and then he drove for a long time until he 
could call in and report the accident. (T. 66) He testified that 
"the time of the accident was just before twilight or dusk. 
There was no need for light but it was right at the end of the 
day." (T. 67) The amount of time it took Mr. Vaughn to stop and 
give aid and then drive to a phone is probably about the amount 
of time before 9:10 p.m. when the accident happened. The 
accident took place approximately 16 or 17 miles north of Beaver. 
(T. 155) 
MR. HOUTZ was found parked to the side of 1-15 just 
North of the Yuba Lake Interchange approximately 15 to 18 miles 
south of Levan. (T. 86) The Court can take judicial notice of 
the distance between the accident scene (16-17 miles north of 
Beaver on 1-15) and where the Houtz vehicle was located (just 
north of the Yuba Lake Interchange on 1-15) . The distance 
appears to be around eighty miles. MR. HOUTZ was approached by 
the officers at approximately 10:50 p.m. (T. 96), and a blood 
alcohol test was drawn at the hospital at 11:36 p.m. (T. 98) 
The only evidence of intoxication presented at the time 
of the accident was the testimony of Floyd Vaughn. Mr. Vaughn 
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did not provide any direct evidence of intoxication at the time 
of the accident but he did observe the Defendant's driving 
ability. Mr, Vaughn testified that he witnessed the accident (T. 
54, 55) , that he had seen what appeared to be the same truck 
about one-half hour before the accident (T. 56) , that at that 
time the vehicle was travelling about seventy to eighty miles per 
hour when it passed Vaughn's vehicle (T. 57). 
He went by fast. He was in the passing lane 
and like ran off onto the berm on that side, 
came back in and moved like all the way into 
the front of us in our lane in one fast motion 
so that Mr. Zadick had to brake to avoid, I 
don't want to say a collision, but danger. (T. 57) 
Later a few minutes before the accident Vaughn observed 
the same truck coming up. 
As he came up alongside our van, I had to get 
over real fast because he almost like bumped 
us side to side or we — he came over like 
right next to me and I just looked directly 
out my driver's side window and he was like — 
the truck was partially in our lane right 
exactly next to me. So I had to move over onto 
the road shoulder and allow him to pass me. (T. 58) 
At that time Vaughn observed the same shirtless male with 
light-colored hair as being the occupant of the truck. (T. 60) 
After passing the van, Vaughn observed: 
. . . he was going fast and he kinda from — 
he almost ran off the road on the — in his 
own lane side, which is the median like between 
the roads ". (T. 60) I saw him run off one side 
of the road, then the other at a high speed. (T.61) 
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When the truck came to the GRONDEL vehicle it was on 
the right hand lane and ". . .it looked like he was pulling in to 
pass, only he just slammed into that car." (T. 62) 
Other than this driving pattern, which could be 
attributed to sleepiness, recklessness, negligence or other 
conditions not caused by intoxication, no other evidence was 
presented to show that the Defendant was under the influence of 
alcohol at the time of the accident. 
POINT A 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S BLOOD ALCOHOL LEVEL AND THE BURNOFF RATE 
OF ALCOHOL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED. 
The Court, over the objection of Defendant's trial 
counsel, admitted the results of a blood alcohol test taken at 
10:36 that evening and evidence of the burnoff rate or 
dissipation rate of alcohol from the blood. 
Section 41-6-44.5 Utah Code Annotated, as Amended, 1953 
as it was written at the time of the accident is as follows: 
(1) In any action or proceeding in which it 
is material to prove that a person was 
driving or in actual physical control of a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
or with a blood alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, the results of a chemical test or 
tests as authorized in section 41-6-44.10 
shall be admissible as evidence. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken within 
two hours of the alleged driving or actual 
physical control, the blood alcohol level of 
the person at the time of the alleged driving 
or actual physical control shall be presumed 
to be not less than the level of the alcohol 
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determined to be in the blood by the chemical 
test. 
(3) If the chemical test was taken more than 
two hours after the alleged driving or actual 
physical control, the test result shall be 
admissible as evidence of the person's blood 
alcohol level at the time of the alleged 
driving or actual physical control, but the 
trier of fact shall determine what weight 
shall be given to the result of the test. 
(4) The foregoing provisions of this section 
shall not prevent a court from receiving 
otherwise admissible evidence as to a 
defendant's blood alcohol level at the time 
of the alleged driving or actual physical 
control. 
Section 76-5-207, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 
1953, as it was in effect at the time of the accident: 
76-5-207 (1) Criminal homicide constitutes 
automobile homicide if the actor, while under 
the influence of alcohol, a controlled 
substance, or any drug, to a degree which 
renders the actor incapable of safely driving 
a vehicle, causes the death of another by 
operating a motor vehicle in a negligent 
manner. For the purposes of this section, the 
standard of negligence shall be that of 
simple negligence, the failure to exercise 
that degree of care which ordinarily 
reasonable and prudent persons exercise under 
like or similar circumstances. 
(2) Any chemical test administered on a 
defendant with his consent or after his 
arrest under this section, whether with or 
against his consent, shall be admissible in 
accordance with the rules of evidence. 
(3) For purposes of this section, a motor 
vehicle constitutes any self-propelled 
vehicle and includes, but is not limited to, 
any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, 
train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft. 
(4) Automobile homicide is a felony of the 
third degree. 
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Section 76-5-207 (2) provides that any chemical test is 
admissible according to the rules of evidence. Section 
41-6-44.5 (3) allows the result of chemical tests administered 
more than two hours after the alleged driving to be admitted but 
the weight to be given such a test is to be determined by the 
trier of fact. 
In State v. Bradley, 578 P. 2d 1267 (1978) the Utah 
Supreme Court, in a case decided before the current amendments to 
the above statutes, allowed a test of Defendant's blood alcohol 
content taken nearly four hours after the accident to be admitted 
into evidence because it was relevant to corroborate the 
testimony of the State's witness who observed the Defendant and 
concluded he was under the influence of alcohol. 
It is unclear whether Section 41-6-44.5 (3) applies to 
Section 76-5-207 since 76-5-207 (2) seems to clearly and 
precisely state the standard for admissibility of chemical tests. 
Bradley, supra, appears to be consistent with the standard in 
76-5-207 (2) . That is to base admissibility on the rules of 
evidence. In the present case, there is no direct evidence of 
intoxication and the blood alcohol test and burnoff rate 
testimony are irrelevant and much to prejudicial to be allowed 
into evidence. Under the Rules of Evidence, that testimony 
should not have been allowed. 
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POINT B 
THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN OF EXCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE 
DEFENDANT COULD HAVE BECOME INTOXICATED AFTER THE ACCIDENT. 
"Mr. Burtis Quarnberg, as an expert witness for the 
State, testified on cross-examination that it would take a little 
over a pint of whiskey injested all at once to achieve a blood 
alcohol level of .27. (T. 147,,128), and that it was possible for 
a person to achieve a blood alcohol level of .27 in two and a 
half hours. (T. 125,149) Mr. Quarnberg felt is was unlikely but 
not impossible. (T. 149) 
The State failed to provide any evidence of drinking 
alcohol prior to the accident and failed to prove Defendant had 
no access to alcohol after the accident. 
In State v. Clark, 296 A.2d 475 (Vermont, 1972), the 
officers came upon an overturned truck and discovered the 
Defendant who appeared to be intoxicated. The Defendant admitted 
that he was the driver of the truck and that the accident 
happened because he had fallen asleep. 
Entirely lacking in the presentation of the 
State was any evidence, direct or circumstantial, 
of the time when the Defendant had the accident... 
"Intoxication may be evidenced circumstantially 
by prior or subsequent condition within such 
time that the condition may be supposed to be 
continuous" 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence §235 (3d ed 1940) 
"This accords with our rule that an inference may 
be and often is retroactive; a trier may from 
present conditions infer a previous fact" Ackerman v. 
Kogut, 117 Vt. 40,44, 84 A.2d 131,134 (1951). 
But it is obvious to have the inference of 
being under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
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applied retroactively in the present case that 
the burden was upon the State of showing by 
evidence that the accident caused by the 
defendant occurred within a time that the 
intoxicated condition, in which he was found at 
the scene, had been continuous since the accident 
time. This burden of proof was not met by the 
State, and its chain of evidence was broken. 
By the omission of this link in its chain 
of evidence, the State failed to prove the 
defendant guilty as charged beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
In Brown v. State, 584 P.2d 231, (Oklahoma, 1978), the 
Court held: 
The evidence showing the defendant was 
intoxicated when arrested at the scene of the 
accident was insufficient to sustain a conviction 
in the absence of evidence as to when the accident 
occurred and of evidence excluding the possibility 
that the defendant could have become intoxicated 
after the accident but before the police arrived. 
In the present case it is clear that at the time of the 
accident the Defendant was speeding and that he was going from 
one side of the road to the other. However, in each instance, 
this side to side motion occurred while passing a vehicle on the 
two lane highway. Whether this driving pattern was caused by 
sleepiness, recklessness, negligence, or drunkennesss is not 
shown by the evidence. Following the accident the Defendant's 
vehicle was not observed again for at least an hour and probably 
closer to two hours later and approximately eighty miles away 
from the accident scene. The record does not show if Defendant 
consumed alcohol after the accident but before his arrest. At 
trial, no one bothered to ask any witnesses if the Defendant had 
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access to alcoholic beverages in his vehicle. In Brown v. State, 
supra at 234, the Court said: 
The fact there was no testimony concerning 
whether the defendants car contained liquor must 
therefore inure to the benefit of the defendant. 
Had the officers been able to testify positively 
that they looked in the car and in the near vicinity, 
and found no liquor or "empties," then that would 
have been one more circumstance tending to indicate 
that the defendant was intoxicated while driving. 
At the conclusion of the State's case, defense counsel 
moved to dismiss Counts 1 and 2 or alternatively to reduce them 
to negligent homocide on the basis that the State did not show at 
the time of the accident that the Defendant, ROBERT GLEN HOUTZ, 
was intoxicated. The Court should have granted this motion and 
in addition, Counts 3 and 4 should also have been dismissed since 
they also require evidence of intoxication at the time of the 
alleged driving. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower Court's refusal to continue the trial until 
MR. HOUTZ could be present resulted in a denial of MR. HOUTZ 
constitutional right to be present at trial. The fact that the 
lower court did proceed without the presence of the Defendant 
requires a reversal of the judgment of conviction and this Court 
should remand the case to the District Court for a new trial. 
In order to provide the Defendant, HOUTZ, with equal 
protection of the laws Defendant should be entitled to be 
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sentenced under the same misdemeanor provisions as the Defendant 
in the Bryan, supra, case. Therefore, Defendant requests that 
this Court reverse his sentencing under the felony provisions of 
the automobile homocide statute and remand the case to the 
District Court to be sentenced as a misdemeanor. 
Plaintiff failed to prove that Defendant was under the 
influence of alcohol at the time of the accident and 
consequently, the conviction and judgment should be reversed and 
Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Information dismissed or in the 
alternative Counts 1 and 2 should be reduced to negligent 
homocide. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 21st day of October, 1985. 
b&y&jf 
LEO G. KANELL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I hand delivered four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Mr. David 
L. Wilkinson, Utah State Attorney General, 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 21st day of October, 
1985. 
^>^g/ 
LEO G. KANELL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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A D D E N D U M 
OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 76-5-301 
76-5-207. Automobile homicide. (1) Criminal homicide constitutes automobile 
homicide if the actor, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor alcohol, a 
controlled substance, or any drug, to a degree which renders the actor incapable 
of safely driving a vehicle, causes the death of another by operating a motor vehicle 
in a negligent manner. For the purposes of this section, the standard of negligence 
shall be that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which 
ordinarily reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or similar circum-
stances. 
(2) The presumption established by subsection 41 6-44(b), relating to Wood alco-
hol percentages, shall be applicable to thts section, ami a«y Any chemical test 
administered on a defendant with his consent or after his arrest under this section, 
whether with or against his consent, shall be admissible in accordance with the 
rules of evidence. 
(3) For purposes of this section, a motor vehicle constitutes any self-propelled 
vehicle and includes, but is not limited to, any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, 
train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft. 
(4) Automobile homicide is a felony of the third degree. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-207, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, §76-5-207; L 1974, ch. 32, §11; 
1981, ch. 63, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 20. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1981 amendment added the second 
sentence of subsec. (1); substituted "subsec-
tion 41-6-44(b)" in subsec. (2) for "section 
41-6-44(b) of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act"; 
substituted "this section" in subsec. (3) for 
"the automobile homicide section"; and made 
a minor change in punctuation. 
Criminal negligence required. 
Criminal negligence, not simple negligence, 
is required to support a conviction of auto-
mobile homicide under this section; criminal 
negligence is defined by 76-2-103(4), and jury 
must be instructed in accordance therewith. 
State v. Chavez (1979) 605 P 2d 1226, overrul-
ing State v. Durrant (1977) 561 P 2d 1056, 
Repealing Clause. 
Section 21 of Laws 1983, ch. 99 provided: 
"Section 41-6-44.2, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as last amended by Chapter 4, Laws of 
Utah 1982, Second Special Session, is 
repealed." 
Effective Date. 
Section 22 of Laws 1983, ch. 99 provided: 
"This act shall take effect August 1, 1983." 
Law Reviews. 
Utah Legislative Survey - 1981, 1982 Utah 
L. Rev. 125, 139. 
State v. Anderson (1977) 561 P 2d 1061 and 
State v. Wade (1977) 572 P 2d 398. 
Where defendant's judgment upon convic-
tion of charge of automobile homicide was 
not final at time of State v. Chavez (1979) 605 
P 2d 1226, ruling that conviction of such 
charge required a finding of criminal negli-
gence, defendant was entitled to claim benefit 
of that ruling. State v. Belgard (1980) 615 P 
2d 1274. 
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41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug or with high blood 
alcohol content — Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant — Suspen-
sion or revocation of license, fa-) (lj It is unlawful and punishable as provided 
in subsection (4) of this section for any person with a blood alcohol content of .08% 
or greater by weight, or who is under the influence of alcohol^ or who is tmder 
the influence of any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree which renders the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or 
be in actual physical control of any a vehicle within this state. The fact that any 
a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled to use 
alcohol or a drug sh*M does not constitute a defense against any charge of violating 
this section. 
41-6-44 MOTOR VKIIICLKS 
(&)—ht any criminal prosecution for a violation of subsection (a-) of this section 
relating to driving a vehicle while under the influence -of alcohol, -or 4n -aity etv44 
stttt or proceeding arising out of ttets alleged to have been committed by a«y person 
while driving or m actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence 
Am. f Am. I A^A^m. U ^ k l ^ l l A * fc. W V \ A m • » >V i d m. t I t I A A d * fcfc j ^ l * • " * m\ V*. A k W *. S* fc* i . A fr fc k | I U I / k i ^ " 1 A fc. J" I" W . * * i • V*d~k. A1 ^k I I A * * A *-J £~m 1% CX i f i t A*m » M « M% 
t / i t t tvt / i t tn^ tilt? ctTTTTTtrrtx t/T ctTtrt/rTTTT TTT t i l t pUrTHJii o TTTTTOvT cTC LI1~ LIlTiU clUUgUU tro 3 I I U T T TI 
by chemical analysis of the person s blood, breath, or other bodily substance shall 
give rise to tne toilowing presumptions! 
(1) If tfrere was at that time O.Oo per eent or less by weight of alcohol m the 
person's blood, it shall be presumed that the person was not under the influence 
of alcohol; 
/ *J \ I 9 4- W d^ *m+A* m U W *~m A-t. A~\ 4- 4 \f\ *. k 4~ 4- 1 f W ^ Am » **% A * f / t / k l l f l d >• + I I 1 l f ^ 1 ^ A Ifc A / M ^ T ITW * * ^~ I / i i i n f U i l l r t I\ f\ W |YAM 
\JS/ i i u i c r u wrra ttu tiictt i n u r TTT cxcuaa rrr XJ.XJIJ pur CUTTC UUL i w a tiittii u.i/o pur 
eeftt by weight of alcohol m tin* person's blood, stteh faet shall not give rise to 
ftfty presumption that the person was or was -not under -the influence -of alcohol, 
but such faet may be considered wtth other competent evidence m determining 
» • • L» •/*• ^ L»- ^ «» 4- \%. AX. TV d«m.**A* A~*. Tm • • 1 f* £» % X W\ AA d~\ W» 4~ ItX ifk \ W\ H « t / M » / > i k A f ** * **<\\\{\1* 
WriClIICr ti l t? pCTTJTTTT V? CIJ u n u t i ToTC IllHUUII^U TTT a i ^ v u v x , 
(&)—If there was at the tittte <&Q8 per eent or more by weight of alcohol m the 
person's blood, it shall be presumed that the person was under the influence of 
alcohol; 
/ A \ * \*h± A**. f / v — A dnm A-*, m w% J-I# r \ ».*-v« i t n i i \ i n f i ^ . £ 4- ie% * **• y» » •• irv/-^^-KAA-|^v|w| r^  W f* 1 I w\ A*%.*- VXAX A A i f t n 4 - —« + AX.AA dt\ f\ 1 * »-y* • 4- i i ^ / i t 
f^f^  i l i e i u i UgUing p r u v i a i u n a t3T Trrra iSUUfcici^tiuii 3TTT*TT TTTTX o e L U I I J I I UUU tns 111111 t i n g 
the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question 
wnetner or not tne person was under tne innuence or aiconoi; 
(e) (2) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood. 
(d) (3) Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of subsection 
(1) of this section shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 60 days 
nor more than six months, or by a fine of $299, or by both such fine and imprison-
ment; provided except that m if the event stteh person shall have has inflicted a 
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated sakl the vehi-
cle in a negligent manner, he shall be punished by imprisonment in the county 
jail for not more than one year, and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine of 
not more than $1,000. For the purposes of this section, the standard of negligence 
shall be is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care 
which ordinarily reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or similar cir-
cumstances. 
(e} (4) In addition to the penalties provided herein for in subsection (3), the 
court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less 
than two 48 consecutive hours nor more than 10 days with emphasis on serving 
in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in *n alcohol rehabilita-
tien facility a community-service work program for not less than two nor more 
than 10 days or and, in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the community-
service work program, order the person to obtain treatment at an participate m 
an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(f) (5) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction under 
this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance 
with subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court shall, in addition to the penalties provided 
for in subsection (d) (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than two 
15 consecutive hours nor more than 10 days with emphasis on serving in the drunk 
tank of the jail, or require the person to work in an alcohol rehabilitation facility 
a community-service work program for not less than 10 nor more than 30 days 
Q* and, In addition to the ]*iil sentence or the work hi _the community-service work 
program, order the person to participate In an assessment and educational series 
at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility and the court may, in its discretion, 
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. Upon a 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND RECUSATIONS 41-6-44 
9L under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted jn compliance with sub-
section 41-6-43 (1), the court shall, Tn addition to the penalties provided for in sub-
section (d) (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 30 nor more than 
90 days with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the per-
son to work in «m alcohol rehabilitation facility a community-service work project 
for not less than 30 nor more than 90 days pkts and, in addition to the jail sentence 
or work in the community-service work program, order the person _to oBFain treat-
ment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. No portion of any sentence imposed pt*r-
suant to under subsection (4) (3) shall be suspended nor shatt and the convicted 
person shall not be eligible for parole or probation until such time as the any^  sen-
tence providecTlfrf m this subsection imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section or 
a local ordinance similar to this section adoptecTln compliance with subsection 
41-6-43 (1) shall not be terminated and the department shall not reinstate any 
license suspended or revoked as a result "oT such conviction, if ~It~is a second or 
subsequent such conviction witEin five years, until and unless tfie convicted person 
has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that~all fines and fees, 
Including fees for restitution, and rehabilitation costs, assessed against the person, 
have been paid. 
(6) The provisions in subsections (4) and (5) that require a sentencing court to 
order a convicted person to participate in an assessment and educational series ait 
a licensed alcohol rehabnitation taciTity, ^ obtain, in the discretion of the court, 
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or "obtain,"mandatorily, treatment 
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or do any combination of those things, apply 
to a conviction for a violation of section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense 
under subsectionT?), so as to require the court to render the same order regarding 
education or treatment at an alcohol "rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection 
with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under section 41-6-45 that qualifies 
as a prior offense under subsection (7), as he would render m connection with 
applying respectively, the "first, secondTor subsequent conviction requirements of 
subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5). For purposes of determining whether a conviction 
under section 41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under subsection (7), 
is & first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous convic-
tion under either section 41-6-44 or 41-6-45 is deemed a prior conviction. Any alco-
hol rehabilitation program and any community-based or other education program 
provided for in this section must be approved by the department of social services. 
(g) (7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted pursuant to sub-
section 41-6-43(b) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original charge of 
a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis 
for the plea, including whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol or 
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense. 
The statement shall be an offer of proof of the facts which show whether or not 
there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defend-
ant, in connection with the offense. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant prior to the acceptance of before 
accepting the plea offered pursuant to under this subsection of the consequences 
of a violation of section 41-6-45 as follows: If the court accepts the defendant's plea 
of guilty or no contest to a charge of violating section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor 
states for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combina-
tion of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, the resulting convic-
tion shall be a prior offense for the purposes of paragraph {£) subsection (5) of 
this section. 
(c) The court shall notify the department of tnotor vehicles of each conviction 
of section 41-6-45, which shall be a prior offense for the purposes of paragraph 
(f) subsection (5) of this section. 
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41-6-44.2 MOTOR VEHICLES 
Ot) [8] A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when tmeh the violation is coupled with an accident or collision in 
which sttdt the person is involved and when stteh the violation has, in fact, been 
committed, although not in his presence, if the officer has reasonable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by atteh the person. 
ft) (9} The department of public safety shall revoke suspend for a period of 90 
days tlie operator's or chauffeur^ iTcense of any person convicted~For the first Time 
under subsection (1) of this section and shall revoke for one year tKe" license ^? 
any person otherwise convicted underTTiTs section, except that the department may 
subtract from any suspension period the number of dayslor which a license was 
previously suspended under section 41-2-19.6 if the previous suspension was based 
on the same occurrence which the record of conviction is basedlipon. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §34; C. 1943, 
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75, § 1; 
1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977, ch. 
268, §3; 1979, ch. 243, §1; 1981, ch. 63, §2; 
1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983, ch. 
103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 33. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1983, ch. 183, discontinuing separate 
classification for chauffeur's license, is effec-
tive January 1,1984. 
The 1982 amendment increased the mini-
mum term in subsec. (d) from 30 to 60 days; 
deleted "not less than $100 nor more than" 
before "$299" in subsec. (d); inserted subsec. 
(e); redesignated former subsec. (e) as (f); 
increased the period of work from not less 
than two nor more than 10 days to not less 
than 10 nor more than 30 days in the first 
sentence of subsec. (f); added "or to obtain 
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facil-
ity" to the first sentence of subsec. (f); 
increased the periods in the second sentence 
of subsec. (f) from not less than 10 nor more 
than 30 days to not less than 30 nor more 
than 90 days; added "plus obtain treatment 
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility" to the 
second sentence of subsec. (f); inserted 
subsec. (g); redesignated former subsecs. (f) 
and (g) as (h) and (ij. 
Effective Date. 
Section 2 of Laws 1982, ch. 46 provided 
that the act should take effect upon approval. 
Approved February 19, 1982. 
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AUT1CLK 4 
ACCIUKNTS 
Laws 1983, ch. 183, discontinuing separate classification for chauffeur's license, is 
effective January 1, 1984. 
Section .,
 D . 
41-6-29. Driver's duty in event of accident - Stop at scene of accident - Penalty. 
41-6-31. Give name — Render assistance. 
41-6-29. Driver's duty in event of accident — Stop at scene of accident — 
Penalty, (a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury 
to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such 
accident or as close thereto as possible but shall then forthwith return to and in 
every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the 
requirements of section 41-6-31. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing 
traffic more than is necessary. 
(b) Any person failing to stop or to comply with said requirements under such 
circumstances shall upon conviction be punished by imprisonment in the county 
jail for not less than thirty 30 days nor more than one year or by fine of not less 
than $100 nor more than $5,000 or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
(c) The department shall revoke the operator's or chauffeur's license of the per-
son so convicted for a period not to exceed one year. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §19; C. 1943, 
57-7-96; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 31. 
41-6-30. Accidents involving damage to vehicle or other property 
— Misdemeanor. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident result-
ing only in damage to a vehicle or other property which is driven or 
attended by any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene 
of such accident or as close thereto as possible but shall forthwith return 
to and in every event shall remain at the scene of such accident until he 
has fulfilled the requirements of section 41-6-31. Every such stop shall be 
made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary. Any person fail-
ing to stop or comply with said requirements under such circumstances 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §20; C. 1943, and substituted "an infraction" for "a misde-
57-7-97; L. 1977, ch. 269, § 1; 1979, ch. 242, § 6. meanor" at the end of the section. 
Compiler's Notes T h e 1979 amendment substituted "a misde-
rh* 1Q77
 a M / j . • * ,, *. . meanor" for "an infraction" at the end of the 
Ihe 1977 amendment inserted "or other section, 
property" near the beginning of the section; 
41-6-31. Give name — Render assistance. The driver of any vehicle involved 
in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehi-
cle which is driven or attended by any person shall give his name, address, and 
the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and shall upon request and 
if available exhibit his operator's or chauffeur's license to the person struck or the 
driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle collided with and shall render 
to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carry-
ing, or the making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician, 
surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such 
treatment is necessary or if such carrying is requested by the injured person. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §21; C. 11M3, 
57-7-98; L. 1983, ch. 183, § 32. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41-6-34. Accidents involving injury, death, or damage of $400 or 
more — Duty to notify police. The driver of a vehicle involved in an acci-
dent resulting in injury to or death of any person or property damage to 
an apparent extent of $400 or more, shall immediately by the quickest 
means of communication give notice of such accident to the local police 
department if such accident occurs within a municipality, otherwise to the 
office of the county sheriff or to a state trooper. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §24; C. 1943, 
57-7-101; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1977, ch. 269, § 3; 
1979, ch. 242, § 7. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1955 amendment inserted "or property 
damage to an apparent extent of $100 or 
more"; and substituted "state trooper" for 
"state highway patrolman." 
The 1977 amendment increased the damage 
amount from $100 to $200. 
The 1979 amendment increased the damage 
amount from $200 to $400. 
Cross-References. 
Collision with unattended vehicle or other 
property, 41-6-32. 
Failure to report accident, penalty, 
41-12-32. 
False or forged reports, penalty, 41-12-32. 
Notice given by occupant of vehicle, 
41-6-36. 
41-6-43.10. Negligent homicide — Death occurring within one year — Pen-
alty — Revocation of license or privilege to drive, ftt) (1} When the death of 
any person ensues within one year as a proximate result of injury received by the 
driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, the person so 
operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide. 
(b) (2) Any person convicted of negligent homicide shall be punished by impris-
onment in the county jail for not more than one year or by fine of not less than 
$100 nor more than $1,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
(e) [3] The department shall revoke the license or permit to drive and any non-
resident operating privilege of any person convicted of negligent homicide* 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-43.10, enacted by L. 
1955, ch. 71, § 1; L. 1957, ch. 78, § 2; 1983, ch. 
99, § 12. 
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AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, Hie accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein Hie crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
A R T . T, 512 CONSTITUTION OP UTAII 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by Hie witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. ]n no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
Hie rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for Hie same offense. 
Comparable Provision. — acquit tal notwi ths tanding defect in in-
Montitna Const., Art . I l l , § 1G. formation or indictment, 77-24-12. 
—acqui t ta l or dismissal without judg-
Cross-References. ment, 77-24-11. 
Defendant as witness, 77-44-5. —;i<-ts punishable in different ways, 
Double jeopardy, s ta tu tory provision, punishment limited to one, 7C-1-23. 
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77-1-6. Rights of defendant, (1) In criminal prosecutions the defend-
ant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
PKKIJMINAKY PROVISIONS 77-1-6 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses 
n his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor 
a husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon 
a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial 
by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by 
a magistrate. 
History: C. 1953, 77-1-5, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, §2. 
Cross-References. 
Actions without payment of fees by 
impecunious suitors, 21-7-2 to 21-7-4. 
Arrest of judgment, effect on further pros-
ecution, 77-35-23. 
Attorneys, rights in disbarment proceed-
ings, 78-51-16. 
Constitutional rights of accused, Const. 
Art. I, §§7-13. 
Counsel for indigents, 77-32-1 et seq. 
Criminal Code provisions on multiple pros-
ecutions and double jeopardy, 76-1 -401 et seq. 
Discharge of defendant turned state's wit-
ness, 77-17-2. 
Discharge of defendant upon compromise 
of offense as barring further prosecution, 
77-35-25. 
Due process of law, Const. Art. I, § 7. 
Errors and defects not affecting substan-
tial rights disregarded, 77-35-30. 
Husband and wife, marital privilege as to 
confidential communications, Rules of Evi-
dence, Rule 28. 
Husband or wife not competent witness 
against or for each other without consent, 
exceptions, 78-24-8. 
Jury trial and waiver thereof, Const. Art. I, 
§ 10; 77-35-17. 
Lineup procedures, 77-8-1 et seq. 
Ordinance violation cases, jeopardy in, 
10-7-65. 
Proceedings when facts charged do not 
constitute an offense, 77-35-17. 
Self-incrimination, Rules of Evidence, 
Rules 24, 25. 
Subpoena for witnesses for impecunious 
defendant in criminal case, 21-5-14. 
Witness unable to procure bond, examina-
tion, 77-35-7. 
Appearance at trial in prison clothing. 
Defendant has a constitutional right not to 
appear in identifiable prison clothing at trial; 
this does not require state to provide defend-
ant with an expensive wardrobe, but state 
should provide clean, respectable clothes, not 
identifiable as prison clothes, for defendant 
at trial. Chess v. Smith (1980) 617 P 2d 341. 
Waiver of right not to stand trial in prison 
clothes. 
Trial judge should on his own initiative 
inquire of a defendant whether he wishes to 
waive his right not to appear in prison 
clothes so that the record affirmatively shows 
an intelligent and conscious waiver by the 
defendant if he chooses to stand trial in 
prison clothes. Chess v. Smith (1980) 617 P 2d 
341. 
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77-35-17. Rule 17 — The trial, (a) In all cases the defendant shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel. The defend-
ant shall be personally present at the trial with the following exceptions: 
(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may 
consent in writing to trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defend-
ant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time 
for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judg-
ment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been 
present; and 
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good 
cause shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous con-
duct 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal 
attendance of the defendant at the trial 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following 
order: 
(1) Misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
UTAH RULB:S OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 77-35-17 
(2) Felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(3) Felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
(4) Misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives 
a jury in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of 
the prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant 
makes written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders 
otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as speci-
fied in section 78-46-5. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of 
the accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or 
made orally in open court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in 
progress with any number of jurors less than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impanelled and sworn, the trial shall pro-
ceed in the following order: 
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the 
defense may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution 
has rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the 
court, for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, 
the court shall instruct the jury; and 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both 
sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the 
defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the 
defense argument. The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument 
of counsel for each party and the time to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an 
alternate juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate 
juror. If no alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to pro-
ceed with the number of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be 
discharged and a new trial ordered. 
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(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view 
the place in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in 
which any other material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted 
in a body under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown 
to them by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer 
shall be sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no 
person other than the person so appointed to speak to them nor to do so 
himself on any subject connected with the trial and to return them into, 
court without unnecessary delay or at a specified time. 
77-35-17 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to sep-
arate or are sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it 
is their duty not to converse among themselves or to converse with, or suf-
fer themselves to be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the 
trial, and that it is their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon 
until the case is finally submitted to them. 
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the 
instructions of the court and all exhibits and papers which have been 
received as evidence, except depositions; and each juror may also take with 
him any notes of the testimony or other proceedings taken by himself, but 
none taken by any other person. 
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept 
together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they 
agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the 
court. Except by order of the court, the officer having them under his 
charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them, or make 
any himself, except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, 
and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person 
the state of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be 
informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the 
officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. 
The court may then direct that the jury be brought before the court where, 
in the presence of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond 
to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given. 
Such response shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion respond 
to the inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court, 
in which case the inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered in the 
record. 
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may 
be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may 
be sent out again. 
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the con-
clusion of all of the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any 
information or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the 
evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein 
or any lesser included offense. 
History: C. 1953, 77-35-17, enacted by L. misdemeanor cases the jury shall consist of 
1980, ch. 14, § 1; L. 1981, ch. 60, § 1; 1982, ch. eight persons; and in all other misdemeanor 
11, § 1. cases the jury shall consist of four persons. 
The court may order the selection of alter-
Compiler's Notes.
 n a t e j u r o r 3 [n a n y caae." 
The 1981 amendment changed the time for 
requesting a jury trial from five to ten days Cross-References. 
prior to trial in subsec. (d). Capital felony, penalty, execution of pen-
The 1982 amendment substituted subsec. alty, 76-3-206, 76-3-207, 77-19-1 et seq. 
(e) for "In caoital cases the iurv shall consist Circuit court trials for ordinance viola-
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